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Abstract
“Modernity” continues to be a useful historiographical tool, however, it is
tension-laden both theoretically and empirically. Conceptually, “modernity”
can denote either a quality (“modern-ness”) or a condition referring to a
specific period in history. With regard to empirical research, the essay takes a
look at the recent history of China, arguing that although there exists a line
between what is modern andwhat is not (betweenmodernity and its Other[s]),
this often appears fuzzy when we look at concrete historical manifestations.
Two case studies bear this out: The first looks at the possibility of locating a
rural modernity, challenging conventional scholarship that has situated the
modern almost exclusively in China’s cities. The second case study elucidates
the relationship between “Chinese” and “global” modernity, striking a
balance between universalistic and pluralistic understandings of modernity.
In sum, the essay shows that it is essential to incorporate the paradoxes
inherent in themodern condition into the analytical framework.
Keywords: modernity, historiography, master narrative, China
Introduction
In the past few decades, many historians have viewed master narratives
with suspicion. Such sweeping accounts, it was argued, squeeze diverse
and variegated historical processes into the Procrustes bed of a uniform
storyline. Microhistory and historical anthropology, with their focus on
small-scale phenomena (such as individuals or local communities) were
proposed as one way of avoiding big narratives that all too often appeared
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to take the nation for granted as the “natural” subject of history.１ A variety
of approaches seeking to transcend national history rather than shrink the
national framework – such as global history or the various concepts com-
ing under the “trans” label (transnational, transregional, transcultural, etc.)
– have made the latter criticism obsolete. On the other hand, master nar-
ratives have retained their usefulness as historiographical tools, in particu-
lar in producing historical syntheses and in providing a common frame-
work for specialist enquiries – the past could not be properly understood if
historians published nothing but disjointed microstudies.２ Rather than
rejecting master narratives out of hand, historians should therefore scruti-
nise individual concepts for what they are worth.
This is exactly what I set out to do in this article. From the perspective
of a historian of China, I examine the value (in other words the potentials
and pitfalls) of modernity as a historiographical concept. For the most part,
I will limit myself to the study of China in the “West” here: Chinese histor-
ians, regardless of to what extent they base themselves on Marxist theory,
have rarely been bothered by notions of Eurocentrism, be it within aca-
demic circles or with regard to a wider public.３ I will argue that in order to
use modernity productively as an analytical category, we need to thor-
oughly engage with its inherent tensions. My starting point is a review of
the rise (or re-emergence) of “modernity” as a master narrative in the 1990s.
I will then discuss the relationship of modernity and its Others before
zooming in on two specific research areas where the problems of “moder-
nity” are particularly salient: the urban-rural divide and China’s relation-
ship with the wider world.
The Rise of “Modernity” in the Historiography of China:
Potentials and Pitfalls
Generally speaking, the emergence of “modernity” as a concept in the 1990s
and its ongoing popularity is somewhat surprising: For it rose from the
ashes of the older modernisation theory, which had gradually crumbled
away as a generation of historians of Asia and Africa coming of age intel-
lectually in the 1970s had castigated it as self-servingly Eurocentric or as
favouring a capitalism-friendly teleology of history.４ In the case of Chinese
history, Paul Cohen’s Discovering History in China, published in the mid-
1980s, debunked the notion that the “West” had been the sole or even the
primary agent of China’s transformation in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Instead, Cohen called for a “China-centred” approach that would
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engage with Chinese history on China’s own terms.５ It is partly a reaction
to this critique that scholars in the early 1990s sought to demonstrate
individual elements of modernity in China’s past, going back until at least
the eighteenth century, in other words to the period before the traumatic
clash with “Western” imperialism. The most obvious case here is the de-
bate on a public sphere/civil society in Chinese history.６ Although it makes
little sense to isolate the historiography of China from other historiogra-
phical trends pointing in the same direction, it is possible to think of this
search for a common historical ground between China and the “West” as
an intellectual link between a China-centred history and the open espousal
of modernity from the mid-1990s onwards. The new perspectives offered in
the late 1990s and early 2000s by the Great Divergence debate on the
simultaneous development of early modern Europe and East Asia as well
as the notion of “multiple modernities” – to which I will return later –,
probably had a similar effect.７
And indeed there are good arguments in favour of modernity as an
analytical concept. Not the least of these is that the term – or equivalents
thereof – has informed the consciousness of historical actors themselves.８
If we discard the self-strengthening (ziqiang) rhetoric of the 1860s to 1890s,
we may safely say that a semantics of modernity has existed in China since
about 1900, expressing itself in a number of terms.９ Most if not all of these
had a political connotation. One was “new” (xin), which since the turn of
the century denoted a marked break with the past, from the Qing dynasty’s
(1644-1912) “New Policies” (Xin zheng) as an ultimately failed attempt to
shore up the declining Imperial authority in the closing decade of the
monarchy, to the influential New Youth magazine (Xin qingnian) founded
in 1915, to the idea of the People’s Republic after 1949 as a “new China”,
exemplified, among others, in the name of its news agency, Xinhua. An
ephemeral alternative was “young” (shaonian), which had been associated
with radical revolutionary or reformist movements before, such as Young
Italy in the nineteenth century or the Young Turks of 1908.１０ Another term
was jianshe, mostly translated as “reconstruction” for an international audi-
ence.１１ Then there were the more literal renderings of the term “modern”,
such as jindai and xiandai, which by adding the suffix hua (“change”) could
be made into an equivalent of “modernisation”. Arguably the most widely
known example is the political slogan of the Four Modernisations (Si ge
xiandaihua), which became the overarching guideline for reshaping post-
Mao China from the late 1970s onwards. In the late 1920s, a phonetic
derivative of the English “modern”, modeng, gained currency; it could be
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used interchangeably with xiandai, but, not unlike Western usage, it even
more often referred to things fashionable.１２
Despite this impressive array of linguistic evidence, there is no reason
why historians should accept the historical actors’ interpretation of them-
selves and their times as a matter of course. Indeed, the bird’s-eye view of
the historian produces a far more comprehensive catalogue of social, cul-
tural and political changes than the worm’s-eye view of even the best-
informed contemporary. As a result, the two perspectives are not on the
same level, nor can we gauge modernity directly by applying instruments
from a social-science toolkit to measure past experiences.１３ On the other
hand, if modernity is to make sense as a historical concept, then historians
need to agree on criteria in order to adequately appreciate the specifics of
change. Candidates that a majority of scholars would no doubt agree on
are the emergence of industrial capitalism and concomitant processes of
urbanisation, the intensification of communication and the growing inter-
connectedness across the globe as well as the spread of scientific rational-
ity. While personal experience of modernity in the early twentieth century
is perhaps best described, in Harry Harootunian’s now classic formulation,
as “speed, shock, and the spectacle of constant sensation”,１４ changes were
often at the same time more subtle and more profound. Consider, for
example, the creation of a new scientific and political vocabulary in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in China, much of which
permeated into everyday usage, contributing crucially to a fundamental
reshaping of the Chinese language.１５
But modernity is a contested concept, and for good reasons too. To
begin with, the term poses semantic difficulties. “Modernity” can mean
two things: it may refer to an inherent quality of being modern, a “mod-
ern-ness”; alternatively, it is conventionally applied to a specific period in
history.１６ While the first meaning is relatively more flexible, the second is
rather static and semantically unfortunate. For “modernity” suggests a state
or condition rather than a process, and this creates all sorts of problems
when historically the terms “modern” and “modernity” (in the original
Latin:modernus/a,modernitas) have been applied – with regard to Europe,
that is – over a period of more than 800 years.１７ Even confining the modern
epoch to the period between the Enlightenment and our own present, as
has become customary, cannot steer clear of the problem that when deal-
ing with modernity, historians stand on constantly shifting ground. Quite
obviously, modernity means a different thing in the digital age of mass
communication than it meant in an age in which steamships, railways
and the truly revolutionary invention of telegraphy were the fastest
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means connecting people with one another. Were it not for its unfortunate
association with modernisation theory, “modernisation” would be the far
better term; for semantically at least, it allows the construction of the
process to which it refers as open and ongoing.１８ The inbuilt teleology of
“modernity”, by contrast, has necessitated terminological and conceptual
fine-tuning, some of which – admittedly with the benefit of hindsight –
appears premature. In 1970s Europe and North America, hit by the oil
shock, economic recession and concerns about the future, the idea of hav-
ing moved into an age beyond industrial modernity – a postmodernity
where knowledge and information were taking over from manufacturing
– no doubt was attractive.１９ On the other hand, the digital age and the
increasing awareness of globalising processes have given rise to second
thoughts about the historical trajectory; indeed, some authors have pro-
claimed a “second modernity” rather than a move beyond the modern.２０
“Modernity” also tends to be Eurocentric, in particular where it is as-
sumed to be a singular phenomenon. The notion that if there is only one
modernity, then it must have its origins in Europe, has a long pedigree
going back to at least the Enlightenment, and its roots reach even deeper
into the past. Generations of historians, building on eighteenth-century
philosophy or yet earlier religious discourses, have inherited a worldview
according to which Europe was moving forward while at the same time
other parts of the world were going backward. Under the influence of
“Western” imperialism, many leading lights outside Europe and North
America subsequently accepted this idea of a degeneration of their own
societies and cultures.２１ If we acknowledge, however, that the continuity
between historical actors and scholarly interpretation is not a given, then
this problem is not insurmountable. Contemporary perspectives and his-
toriography are potentially disjointed, and attempts at pluralising moder-
nity – such as the search for “multiple modernities” or the notion of a
“coeval” modernity allowing for the contemporaneousness and coexistence
of different forms of modernity – have worked towards a “provincialisation
of Europe”, to borrow Dipesh Chakrabarty’s term.２２ I will return to this
aspect in the latter part of the essay.
Partly as a result of this inbuilt teleology, the concept of “modernity” is also
inherently normative. It has been driven by the idea that history is not only a
process of continual change, but that this change is usually (if not always) for
the better. As a result, it has proved difficult to integrate starkly gloomy
episodes into the fabric of the modernity narrative: The debates about Nazism
and to what extent it can be described as modern is the most obvious case in
point, although the destructive aspects of modern Chinese history – such as
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the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of 1851-1864 or the Cultural Revolution slightly
over a century later – furnish equally illustrative examples.２３
Yet another problem of the modernity debate is its level of abstraction.
Proponents and critics of the concept argue about its general validity on a
theoretical level, but provide little guidance as to how the pros and cons
should be translated into empirical research. I agree with Carol Gluck that
debating modernity is both a theoretical and an empirical problem.２４ “Mod-
ernity” is sufficiently problematic to require handling with care and suffi-
ciently helpful to hold on to, the more so as alternative concepts either are
not in sight or lack the universal acceptance to serve as a common platform
for a large, international and interdisciplinary community of scholars. In
what follows, I propose that we look at the tensions within “modernity” and
with their help turn the concept into a productive research tool: tensions
between the perspectives of historical actors and historians, tensions be-
tween modernity and its Other(s), tensions between different spatio-social
entities (such as city and countryside), tensions finally between a reading of
modernity in the singular and in the plural. These tensions will be elabo-
rated on in the following sections. After a rather brief discussion of moder-
nity and its Other(s), I will focus on two areas that have been discussed in
terms of modernity: urban modernity and the concomitant question
whether we can speak of a rural modernity in China; and global modernity
with a view to the question whether modernity should be conceptualised as
singular or plural. Not all of the empirical studies on which I draw are
explicitly focused on modernity, but all of them can be harnessed to a
discussion of modernity’s relevance for Chinese history.
Modernity and its Other(s)
All concepts are defined against at least one explicit or implicit Other.
Were it not so, they would lose their edge. An all-encompassing concept
would be completely useless as a means of intellectually engaging with the
world. This is also true of modernity: If there are phenomena that can be
described as modern, there must be others that are not. As modernity has
not always been there but has emerged historically, we must be able to
trace its genealogy – or alternatively, if different modernities have made
their appearance over time, we need to be able to say what distinguishes
the modernity we currently live in (our modernity) from previous ones. In
attempting to do so, I wholeheartedly endorse Sheldon Pollock’s view that
“[t]here is no shame in premodernity”.２５
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The problem with “modernity” is not that it lacks an Other from which to be
distinguished. Quite the contrary. In the case of China, American scholars
in the 1950s and 1960s operated with a binary tradition-modernity scheme
borrowed from the arsenal of modernisation theory. “Tradition” here re-
ferred not so much to a historically transmitted chain of values, ideas and
practices, but to a condition that was transformed in the process of moder-
nisation. Two elements were of crucial importance: Firstly, the transition
from tradition to modernity was wholesale, radiating from one sector of
society into all others. And secondly, China – as all non-“Western” societies
– did not have any inherent potential of radically transforming tradition.
“[W]ithout direct Western contact”, wrote three leading East Asia specia-
lists in a widely read textbook, ideas and practices “underwent only ‘change
within tradition’”.２６ Another eminent China scholar, Joseph R. Levenson,
opened his monumental intellectual history of Confucianism in the modern
era by asking whether China, “without the catalytic intrusion of Western
industrialism”, could have evolved into “a society with a scientific temper”.
Somehow the question was rhetorical, because predictably the answer was
no.２７ The problem about the binary polarisation of tradition and modernity
is that both are understood as distinct aggregate states so that movements
from one to the other are always complete. This failure to conceptualise
transformation other than as an unambiguous clear-cut change has been
one of the fundamental weaknesses of classical modernisation theory.２８
On the other end of the spectrum, we might consider whether to view
modernity as a condition that encompasses the (seemingly) non-modern
or even anti-modern. This appears to be a fairly recent perspective; I take
my cue from a publication on the Boxer War arguing that this event was “a
wholly modern episode and a wholly modern resistance to globalization,
representing new trends in modern China and in international relations”.２９
Indeed, there were many modern aspects to the Boxer War of 1900-1901.
Consider, for example, the way that thrilled audiences were kept abreast of
developments via the telegraph, the novelty of a multi-national interven-
tion that foreshadowed practices of the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries, or the fact that the “Western” troops were facing a Chinese
army that was technologically and tactically their match.３０ But at the core
of anti-imperialist resistance was neither the Chinese military nor the
Chinese government, but the Boxer movement. As research by Paul
Cohen, Joseph Esherick and others has shown, the Boxers were enmeshed
in popular culture and religion, attempting to offset “Western” weaponry
through spirit possession as well as invulnerability rituals and espousing a
rigorous Luddism.３１ As a consequence, referring to the Boxer War as
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“wholly” modern presupposes a concept of modernity that subsumes the
anti-modern under the modern. Such an approach, however, irons out the
inconsistencies, contradictions and tensions of the modern condition,
turning “modernity” into a catch-all concept devoid of substance. It
makes far more sense, as a number of studies have done, to look at anti-
modern resistance to state expansion, reform projects and the concomi-
tant tightening of the tax screw, especially in rural China, from the 1900s
and the 1950s (and possibly beyond).３２ As these studies show, modernity is
always a contested, never to be taken for granted process. What matters is
that historical enquiry should refrain from a normative teleology, acknowl-
edging resistance to modernity as a legitimate standpoint. The felicitous
phrase by Pollock already cited above３３ – that there is no shame in pre-
modernity – applies not only to the macroperspective of historical period-
isation, but also to microhistorical empiricism.
If neither a binary polarity nor the eradication of all distinctions is
helpful, how can we capture the relationship between modernity and its
Other(s)? I will suggest an answer by drawing on two examples. The first is
about continuity.３４ In his examination of the modern Chinese state, Philip
Kuhn has argued that its origins lay in responses to three constitutional
problems of the late Imperial system: how to confront the abuse of power,
how to control the majority of the educated elite not in government service
and how to keep in check a populous society by means of a small territorial
administration.３５ With regard to the latter, Kuhn demonstrates how even a
measure such as Mao’s collectivisation in the 1950s had roots that went
further back than the exigencies of socialist transformation. Essentially, he
argues, the Maoist state was bent on eliminating middlemen in the taxa-
tion system, tax payment by proxy having been one of the central features
(and problems) of late Imperial as well as early Republican China.３６ This
means that much of the institutional innovation in modern China was
underpinned by an ongoing search for a solution to an enduring problem.
It is therefore important to see the creation of a modern state not so much
as a clean break with what preceded it, but rather to emphasise continu-
ities and connections with the Imperial past.
My second example concerns religion, which for a long time has been
regarded as an almost quintessential Other of modernity, following the Marx-
ian and Weberian tradition that in modern society, religion would be ulti-
mately doomed to vanish. It has taken a long time to realise that, in Peter
Berger’s words, “[t]he world today [. . . ] is as furiously religious as it ever
was”.３７ This realisation has opened up new perspectives on the relationship
of religion and modernity. In a fascinating study, the Cambridge-based Tibe-
282 VOL. 2, NO. 3, 2014
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR HISTORY, CULTURE AND MODERNITY
tologist Hildegard Diemberger has shed new light on Tibetan responses to the
changes in religious policy undertaken by the Chinese Communist Party after
1978. From inside Tibet, the period of “reform and opening” (gaige kaifang)
proclaimed by the Chinese leadership is viewed as the era of the “further
spread of the [Buddhist] doctrine”, a continuation of two earlier periods of
Buddhist expansion in the sixth to ninth and tenth to eleventh centuries.３８ To
a considerable extent, this revival has been accompanied by a recovery of
sacred texts that has all the trappings of the digital age: Not only are foreign
libraries scoured for Buddhist writings, which are then often digitised to make
them available for religious use at home; more importantly, CDs have become
part of Tibetan Buddhist book culture and are sometimes treated as prayer-
wheels, “spinning their sacred message at electronic speed”.３９ We are dealing
here with two different temporalities, one subjective and to a degree back-
ward-looking, connecting the present with a glorious past; the other in tune
with the brave new world of the digital age, looking to the future (and per-
haps more obvious from the vantage point of the academic observer). The
Tibetan Buddhists discussed by Diemberger apparently do not aspire to being
modern; yet they have no problems with living in a modern age. The relation-
ship between modernity and its Other(s) is by no means clear-cut, it thrives
on tensions and contradictions. We will encounter this problematic as we
proceed to take a closer look at two specific research areas.
Figure 1 Tibetan monk typing a Buddhist text into a computer. In recent years, CDs
have become part of Tibetan Buddhist book culture, revealing different temporalities
within “modernity”.
(Photograph: Hildegard Diemberger)
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Urban Modernity! Rural Modernity?
When rifling through the historical literature on Chinese modernity, one
impression is paramount: Chinese modernity is urban. This is confirmed,
among others, by a fairly recent volume on everyday life in modern China,
in which the countryside gets no mention at all.４０ In all probability, this is
no coincidence but reflects a fundamental shift in the focus of China his-
torians. In the decades following the foundation of the People’s Republic in
1949, what needed to be explained was the successful Communist seizure
of power. This had come to pass through a successful agrarian revolution,
and the social and economic change of the 1950s gripped the countryside
as much – perhaps even more – than it did the cities. From the 1980s
onwards, academics focused their attention on the new China of economic
reform, and since the late 1990s, this trend has intensified in tandem with
China’s rise as an economic world power. The China emerging from this
rise was increasingly urban and middle-class, a shift that prompted re-
searchers to increasingly preoccupy themselves with urban modernity.
Enquiries into the history of modern urban spaces have produced a vast
number on studies on individual cities, to the extent that they cannot be
exhaustively discussed in this article. The majority of publications have
focused on Shanghai, although this cosmopolitan metropolis can hardly
be said to have been representative of China at large.４１ Other cities that
have been studied include Guangzhou, Chengdu, Tianjin and Beijing.４２
Major themes have included urban self-government – a twentieth-century
innovation building on some pioneering developments in the nineteenth
–, the transformation of cityscapes and new policies such as public health.
Other studies take this reconfiguration as a starting point for looking at
how political spaces have been created, the most important of these being
Tian’anmen Square in Beijing, which became a site of symbolic political
contest for the first time in 1919.４３ Cultural production, the emergence of a
consumer culture and the fledgling media have also been analysed as parts
of an urban modernity.４４
When it comes to modernity, it appears that much of urban historio-
graphy discusses the late Qing and Republican eras, in other words the
formative period of modern China. Rather unsurprisingly, the emphasis is
more on the ruptures with the past, on the new things that were taking
shape and that changed the face of China for good. However, this process
was an uneven one, as some studies remind us. For one thing, although
cities became better integrated, evolving into an urban network, there was
a keen awareness of the difference between the more “advanced” coastal
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cities and the more “backward” cities in the interior of China in the first
half of the twentieth century.４５ For another, not all urban dwellers shared
equally in the blessings of modern life, such as glitzy shopping venues,
music halls and cinemas. The poorest urbanites did not use public trans-
port and their mobility was for the most part restricted to their own neigh-
bourhood; they wore cheap, hand-sewn clothing produced and purchased
locally. The downside of urban life up until the end of the Republican era
included beggary, crime and prostitution.４６ Perhaps no feature of urban life
in early twentieth-century China embodies the conceptual tensions of
“modernity” more than the rickshaw, which was adopted from Japan. In
an era of increasing motorisation, it used the most archaic form of propul-
sion imaginable: human energy. And yet, with its rubber tyres, its success
as a commonly used means of transport was as dependent on paved,
macadamised or tarmacked roads as were cars or autobuses.４７
Figure 2 “Tsingtau. ‘Our taxameters’” (1914). The photograph shows a rickshaw puller
in the German leasehold of Qingdao (Tsingtau). Despite using an archaic form of
propulsion, rickshaws required modern technologies of road building to operate
properly.
(Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tsingtau_Taxameter_1914.jpg)
Interestingly, whereas the inequalities of Chinese urban modernity have
been acknowledged at least by a number of researchers, it appears that the
question to what extent the rural areas had a share in Chinese modernity
has rarely been asked. To a degree, this is surprising, as cities and country-
side were not hermetically sealed off from one another: indeed, in the early
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twentieth century a lot of the industrial workforce as well as a considerable
part of groups at the bottom of urban society – such as rickshaw pullers
and beggars – were recent migrants with rural origins.４８ And clearly the
countryside was needed to feed the urban population. But the changes
experienced in the countryside have been obscured by the idea of an
urban-rural divide that emerged in the cities in the first half of the twen-
tieth century. Since about the 1920s, country folk were ridiculed as conser-
vative bumpkins unable to keep up with the new forms of lifestyle sprout-
ing in the cities.４９ The early decades of the twentieth century also wit-
nessed the appearance of a new semantics of the Chinese “peasant”. By
adopting the term nongmin from Japanese, not only did leftist intellectuals
construct the peasants as a social class; they also associated that class with
other terms such as “feudalism” (fengjian) and “superstition” (mixin), there-
by endowing it with a specific temporality (that of the past), marking it as
backwards and in need of a complete overhaul.５０
At the same time, the urban dwellers’ notion of a radical divide between
the “modern” city and the “backward” countryside should also be seen as
the starting point of the radical transformation of life in rural China at the
hands of a largely urban-socialised elite.５１ The story of this shift does not
have to be told in modernist language: It is also possible to present it,
underpinned by a negative teleology and perhaps in somewhat nostalgic
terms, as an example of “deagrarianisation”, as the decline of a rural or
peasant lifestyle. Such a narrative may have been reinforced by the rapid
rural urbanisation in China since the 1990s.５２ But even when adopting it,
one still has to account for the remarkable change in the Chinese country-
side.
China’s agricultural transformation began as early as the 1860s and
gained momentum in the early 1900s through the founding of peasant
associations, the establishment of model farms using capitalist methods
of production, the transmission of agronomic knowledge through agricul-
tural schools and the introduction of chemical fertiliser.５３ In the Repub-
lican era, this approach was continued and expanded by warlord govern-
ments and by the Rural Reconstruction Movement, which sponsored local
model projects focusing on education, local self-government and the for-
mation of cooperatives.５４ After 1927, the Nationalist government likewise
pursued a “green revolution” aimed predominantly at developing new
breeds, raising quality standards and stabilising the peasants’ economic
situation by making cheap credit available.５５ The 1930s witnessed an in-
crease in commercialisation, but also a first, small wave of mechanisation
and industrialisation – mostly in peasants’ subsidiary occupations, such as
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textile production.５６ A second wave followed in the 1940s and 1950s under
early Communist rule, a third in the 1980s.５７
The Communist Party of China (CCP), who seized power locally in the
late 1920s and 1930s and at the national level in 1949, took an altogether
different approach. For them, the solution to rural China’s problems lay in
a radical restructuring of the relations of (agricultural) production, in other
words of property relations. This was connected with a process of state-
building. As Pauline Keating, writing from the vantage point of the local
level, has argued, the Communist revolution was “at one and the same
time a restoration movement in the style of imperial restorations of Chi-
na’s past and a ‘modernization’ movement centered on economic develop-
ment”.５８ But the Communists not only altered class structures and the
mode of production, first through the redistribution of land and in the
1950s through collectivisation. They also sought to change the social and
cultural fabric, e.g. by introducing the new Marriage Law of 1950, which
abolished arranged marriages and for the first time made it possible for
rural people to divorce.５９
To determine whether we can speak of “rural modernity” in twentieth-
century China, we must decide what exactly it is we mean by this term. If
we understand modernity as a condition, then we are running into difficul-
ties. To begin with, the urban-rural divide has never been fully bridged,
even into the twenty-first century; China’s peasants are still, as one Chi-
nese-language publication has argued, “second-class citizens”.６０ Nor did
the peasantry see themselves as modern the way a sizeable number of
urbanites did at the same time. Peasants embraced social change when
they could turn it to their advantage (e.g. by participating in the land
reform or by exercising their right to control their sexual life), but they
also resisted technological innovations under the Nationalists or found
ways to withhold grain from the Communist cadres, who sought to extract
as much as possible from the peasantry so the state could feed the urban
population.６１ Clearly, we need to state that prior to the take-off of rural
industrialisation in the 1980s and 1990s, rural China was not modern. But
then cities, as we have seen, were not uniformly modern either. If we view
modernity as a quality, however, then we might say that modern elements
were infused into the countryside, even if this presupposes the impact of
urban modernity.
As a final point in exploring the tensions and paradoxes of modernity in
rural China, I will turn to the collectivisation of the 1950s and its sad
climax, the Great Famine of 1958-1962, whose human tragedy has recently
been covered by a number of monographs.６２ As its dimensions have pro-
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gressively taken shape, this greatest man-made disaster in history has not
been debated in terms of modernity, and indeed such a discussion is prob-
ably counterintuitive. But it is revealing, too, as the Famine was the unin-
tended consequence of the collectivisation policy of the 1950s. The creation
of ever greater collectives deprived individual households of decision-mak-
ing over agricultural production, integrating them into an institutional
framework characterised by rationalisation, bureaucratic planning and
mechanisation – all of which would, by any textbook definition, count as
tokens of modernity. Ironically, it was the move to dismantle the collec-
tives – in which the peasants, for once, took the lead６３ – which unleashed
the productive forces of Chinese agriculture in the late 1970s. In other
words, a time-honoured way of agricultural production won out over a
seemingly more “modern” one, turning our wonted chronology on its
head. The distinction between “modernity” and its Other(s) are by no
means clear-cut, a phenomenon that we also observe when looking at the
problems of China’s role within global modernity.
Chinese Modernity vs. Global Modernity
Whereas the classic modernisation theory postulated world-wide conver-
gence as the ultimate outcome of the modernisation process, the 1990s saw
a development towards a conceptual pluralising of modernity. To a degree
this was spurred by tangible evidence: China, India and other global
players were acknowledged as being undoubtedly modern, but political
and cultural differences to Europe and North America were undeniable.
This realisation of the world being pluralistic is reflected in Shmuel Eisen-
stadt’s concept of “multiple modernities”. Eisenstadt does not doubt that
“the civilization of modernity developed first in the West”; yet he not only
points to the “internal antinomies and contradictions” in “Western” mod-
ernity.６４ Despite championing a mildly diffusionist model, he also empha-
sises that societies in Asia and Africa appropriated modern ideas selec-
tively, reinterpreting and reformulating them in the process, which re-
sulted in a world that is both globalised and culturally pluralised, denying
the “West” a monopoly on modernity.６５ By contrast, Harry Harootunian’s
notion of “coeval modernity” is less interested in origins and diffusions.
Based on Ernst Bloch’s and Reinhart Koselleck’s ideas about non-synchron-
ism or the contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous, Harootunian
develops his idea that alternative modernities – in his case that of Japan
– “shared the same historical temporality (as a form of historical totalizing)
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found elsewhere in Europe and the United States”. And he goes on to say
that “whatever and however a society develops, it is simply taking place at
the same time as other modernities”.６６
Such pluralistic notions of modernity have not gone uncontested. In the
process of pluralisation, it has been argued, the actual meaning of “moder-
nity” is lost. Instead of one recognisable phenomenon, we are left with an
array of multiple yet incommensurable ones.６７ Another question is
whether it is legitimate, after all, to link alternatives to European moder-
nity to certain peoples and to denote a specific kind of modernity (if that is
what it is) as “Chinese” or “Islamic”.６８ On the other hand, the increasing
awareness of global interconnectedness has stimulated the search for a
“global modernity” that results from globalisation and more specifically
from global capitalism.６９
In looking at the relationship between “Chinese” modernity and global
modernity, I am even more than usually aware that “China” cannot be
taken for granted as an analytical category. Partly because the name
“China” (and its equivalents in the Chinese language) has meant different
things at different times, was – in its modern sense – used abroad before it
was adopted in China itself, and is by all means a fairly recent term,
originating informally in the late nineteenth century and officially with
the proclamation of the Republic of China (Zhonghua Minguo) in 1912.７０
Partly because, as William Kirby has written, “the lines between things
international, or global, or external, on the one hand, and things ‘Chinese’,
on the other hand, are in many realms nearly impossible to draw”.７１ How-
ever, by looking more closely at empirical findings, we may get a clearer
sense of the complex fabric in which Chinese modernity was enmeshed. In
so doing, it is important to destabilise the notion that global modernity is
tantamount to “Western” modernity, while at the same time we must
acknowledge that in the formative period of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, China’s becoming part of the modern world took
place within an unequal power structure: To an extent at least, China was
pushed into the wider world by “Western” imperialism, e.g. in adopting
new forms of diplomatic intercourse as well as opening itself up for com-
merce, as much as it was pulled in an attempt to find its rightful place in
the emerging global order.
The transformation of Chinese concepts of time is a good starting point
for our discussion. I am concerned here with two different expressions of
this transformation. The first is the adoption of a linear mode of concep-
tualising time. Such a perspective had not been unknown in China (genea-
logical records function this way, for example), but the dominant mode, in
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particular with regard to historiography, was cyclical. It was the confronta-
tion with imperialism and the experience of dynastic decline and “unpre-
cedented change” in the mid-nineteenth century that prompted a number
of literati to conceive of China’s recent past in a linear mode, which could
then be extended to more remote periods. In part, the effort aimed at
countering “Western” ideas about China’s history as stagnant.７２ The intro-
duction of linear time also gave rise to a modern, professional historiogra-
phy in the early twentieth century that began to rely on methods of textual
criticism. If Leopold von Ranke became its model, Chinese historians de-
liberately overlooked his religious convictions and political conservatism
because they aimed at reviving the empiricist Confucian school of the
eighteenth century, hoping to demonstrate that modern science could go
hand in glove with Chinese culture.７３ At the same time, the application of
new methods led to surprising results: While some early historians, draw-
ing on textual analysis, had doubted that the Chinese civilisation was
indeed of great antiquity, the excavations at Anyang between 1928 and
1934 provided material evidence of the Shang dynasty and allowed tracing
back China’s history to the second millennium BC.７４ Modern historiogra-
phy could thus help to boost a sense of Chinese self-confidence and cultur-
al authenticity.
The second new conceptualisation of time, the adoption of the Gregor-
ian calendar on 1 January 1912, provides an even more striking example.
The move was one of several measures of the early Republican govern-
ments to mould the Chinese population into a modern citizenry by intro-
ducing new, “Western” fashions and forms of etiquette.７５ In the 1920s and
1930s, the Nationalist regime even converted traditional holidays and an-
niversaries of pre-1912 revolutionary events to the solar calendar.７６ This
pattern was not confined to China alone, in fact, it was a global trend
followed by quite a few new and mostly revolutionary regimes. Japan and
Egypt had switched to the Gregorian calendar as early as the 1870s, Albania
followed the same year as China, and within a few years Finland (1917),
Soviet Russia (1918) and Turkey (1926) joined in.７７ Calendars are social
conventions, not scientific facts, and there is nothing to suggest that the
“Western” calendar was in any way more “modern” than the old, lunisolar
one, which was kept in tune with the changing seasonal rhythm by insert-
ing intercalary months. Practical considerations aside (e.g., to coordinate
times better on an international scale), the reform was grounded in the
identification of “Western” with “modern”. However, at least one signifi-
cant adaptation was made: Rather than following the Christian era, the
new calendar counted the years of the Republic (with 1912 as the year 1),
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thus bringing the revolutionary government in line with the Imperial dy-
nasties that preceded it. This practice still continues in present-day Tai-
wan. And the practical value of the new calendar was limited anyway:
many people held on to the old one, not least because it determined the
major religious festivals, a practice which is still common in today’s
China.７８ Calendar reform is a fine example of how the Chinese government
deliberately sought to connect to a global and – in this case – “Western”-
defined modernity, but for reasons both voluntary and coincidental, this
transformation remained incomplete. The outcome, therefore, was neither
simply “Western” nor simply “Chinese”. It was not simply “global” either,
although China was jumping on the bandwagon of a worldwide trend. And
to a degree, it blurs the temporality suggested by diffusionist models – not
all of Europe was equally modern or “ahead” of China.
Yet, pointing to modernity as the result of adapting “Western” concepts,
practices, and objects simply repeats a diffusionist understanding. It is
important to point out that China not only looked to the “West” for in-
spiration. Its involvement with global modernity also included an intellec-
tual (and to an extent practical) engagement with countries in Asia, Africa,
the Pacific and Latin America. This is an important field still awaiting
closer scrutiny. There is evidence, however, that Chinese nationalism and
anti-imperialism, both ingredients of the Chinese modern experience,
were fuelled by knowledge of the fate of colonised peoples across the
world. By the turn of the twentieth century, Chinese intellectuals had
begun to closely watch the American annexation of Hawaii, the Philippine
revolution and the Boer War in South Africa, drawing lessons for the future
development of China.７９ An illumination of the relationship between
China, India, the Ottoman Empire/Turkey and also Latin American coun-
tries such as Mexico is necessary and might help to flesh out China’s loca-
tion within a global modernity that was neither simply of “Western” mak-
ing nor pitting the “West” and the “rest” against one another in a binary
relationship.８０
Another misunderstanding that needs clarification consists in invari-
ably placing China at the receiving end of global modernity. This may be
partly a problem of China scholars, who tend to see “China” as the object of
their analysis, running the risk of hypostatising it. It is vital, however, to
understand the ways in which China contributed to shaping the modern
world. By way of example, let me discuss here the global repercussions of
Maoism and the Mao cult in the 1960s and 1970s, which are widely re-
garded as a period of social reform and renovation, particularly in Western
Europe and North America. To appropriately gauge the impact of the wor-
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ship of Mao, one must first take a broader look at the history of political
religion in China.８１ On a global level, political religion can be seen as the
solution to the decline of transcendent legitimacy of political authority in
the modern world. In China, the 1911 Revolution had dismantled the sacral
Figure 3 An advertisement for cigarettes. Such advertisements were called “calendar
posters” (yuefenpai) because they included a calendar, in this case for the year 1918.
Like other examples of the same genre, this one juxtaposes a Western-style Gregorian
calendar and a Chinese-style lunisolar calendar, pointing to the often uneasy
coexistence of time-honoured, “local” and seemingly more “modern” and “global”
forms of conceptualising time.
(Source: private archive of the author)
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aura with which state religion had endowed the Emperor, who had served
– to all intents and purposes – as its high priest. Mao and the CCP were not
the first to have tried out the sacralisation of a modern political leader. In
fact, they could rely on the historical precedent of the Sun Yatsen cult,
installed by the National Party (Guomindang, GMD) in the mid-1920s
under Soviet influence and in direct emulation of Lenin (though reminis-
cences of the first Ming emperor also played a role).８２ Although the Na-
tionalists were following the Soviet precedent, it would be grossly mislead-
ing to state a difference in modernity here. It is far more appropriate to
speak of a conjunction of emerging political religions; on a timeline, the
Chinese case followed in the wake of Bolshevism and Italian Fascism, but
preceded similar developments in Turkey as well as Nazi Germany.８３
By the same token, the cult of Mao owed a lot to that of Stalin; but as in
the fields of ideology and economic reconstruction, it was equally a site of
emancipation from the Soviet “big brother”. In the 1960s and 1970s, when
China was presenting itself as a Communist alternative, Mao’s name, his
image and his writings began to appeal to a widely divergent global con-
stituency. On the one end of the spectrum, this included revolutionary
liberation movements in largely agrarian societies, from the Naxalites in
India to the Shining Path in Peru, the viciously brutal Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia and – much later – the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist).８４
On the other end of the spectrum, the Mao cult was adapted by extra-
parliamentary groups in Europe seeking to create new forms of public
protest by provoking established authorities and state institutions. Such
forms, which turned political action into stage-managed events, were “dee-
ply rooted in Futurist, Situationist and avant-garde art theory”.８５ Mao was
one icon amalgamated into the new protest culture; at the same time, his
China seemed to be offering a concrete utopia on which to model the
rebirth of “Western” societies. It almost goes without saying that each of
these adaptations was connected with but different to the original contexts
in which Mao had become an icon: the civil war in China from the 1920s
through the 1940s, the consolidation of Communist rule after 1949 and the
Cultural Revolution of the 1960s as both a social protest movement and an
attempt by Mao to radically restructure political authority.８６ The Mao cult
was the product of a modern culture of mass politics that could be trans-
mitted on a global scale. Prior to its decline in the wake of Mao’s death and
Deng Xiaoping’s reform policy, it was a major force that emanated from
China and, for better or for worse, contributed to fundamental changes
across the world.
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Conclusion
Modernity is still a useful tool with which to capture the transformation of
China (and indeed the globe) in the past 250 years: It has provided a
conceptual framework for our understanding of the transition from Imper-
ial autocracy to mass politics, the introduction of new forms of knowledge,
industrialisation, the emergence of urban and cosmopolitan lifestyles, to
name but a few. At the conceptual level, however, modernity is too easily
taken for granted, with scholars failing to take into account just how am-
biguous and elusive it can prove. In order to exhaust the full potential of
“modernity” as a tool of understanding, it is essential that its inherent
paradoxes are properly integrated into the analytical framework: Moder-
nity is a lived experience and an analytical concept, an ideology and a set
of processes “on the ground”; it can be radically new and is always incom-
plete (and not necessarily linear); it of urban origin and encompasses the
countryside; it has “Western” and Chinese roots; it is uniquely Chinese and
it integrates China into global processes. As shown above, scholarship over
the past decades has already provided us with data highlighting the com-
plexities of modernity. What is necessary is to develop a better analytical
grasp of the ambiguities and contradictions of the modern in empirical
research on China.
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